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The Internet and the Legitimacy of Remote
Cross-Border Searches
Jack L. Goldsmitht
In the fall of 2000, the FBI learned that hackers were break-
ing into the computer networks of banks, internet service provid-
ers, and other firms in the United States. From computers in the
United States, the FBI traced the source of the hack to servers in
Russia. The FBI tried, and failed, to secure Russian assistance in
monitoring and redressing the criminal activity. It decided to act
unilaterally. After obtaining a search warrant in the United
States, it used a "sniffer" keystroke recording program to learn
the hackers' usernames and passwords. It then used this infor-
mation to download incriminating information from the hackers'
computers in Russia.1
The FBI's actions are known as remote cross-border searches
and seizures. Searches and seizures of this sort are an important
tool in fighting cybercrime. Cross-border theft, hacks, worms, and
denial-of-service attacks cause significant damage to computer
systems in the United States. To redress such crimes, it is crucial
to identify the computer source of the criminal activity and seize
(or at least freeze) information relevant to the crime before re-
cords of it are erased. The demand for information about com-
puter activity abroad will undoubtedly increase significantly in
the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the
United States.
One way for a nation to get information on a computer in an-
other nation is to cooperate with enforcement officials in the
source nation. The problem is that such cooperation is often diffi-
cult. Sometimes the source-country government lacks legal au-
thority to seize and freeze computer information within its bor-
t Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. Thanks to Neal Katyal, Adrian
Vermeule, Eric Posner, Tracey Meares, and Kal Raustiala for helpful comments, and Dave
Scott and Josh Walker for research assistance.
1 See Robert Lemos, Lawyers Slam FBI 'Hack,' ZDNet News (May 1, 2001), available
online at <http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,5082126,00.html> (visited July
6, 2001) [on file with U Chi Legal F]. See also Allison Linn, FBI's Elaborate Hacker Sting
Pays Off- High-Tech Gambit Nets 2 Russians, Chi Trib 20 (May 10, 2001).
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ders. Sometimes it lacks the technological capacity. Sometimes
the enforcement machinery in the source country will simply take
too long, because evidence of the crime can quickly be destroyed
or anonymized. And sometimes, as in the opening example, the
source-country government simply fails to cooperate. For these
and other reasons, officials in the target country might take mat-
ters into their own hands. Sitting at their computers, they might
trace the origins of the cybercrime, and explore, freeze, and store
relevant data located on computers abroad.
Many believe that such cross-border searches and seizures on
computer networks by enforcement officials in one country violate
the territorial sovereignty of the country where the data is lo-
cated.2 This view appears to find support in the international law
prohibitions on extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction. The Re-
statement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law states these limits as
follows: "It is universally recognized, as a corollary of state sover-
eignty, that officials in one state may not exercise their functions
in the territory of another state without the latter's consent."3
The Restatement adds that one state's law enforcement officials
"can engage in criminal investigation in [another] state only with
that state's consent."4
This essay argues that remote cross-border searches and sei-
zures are consistent with international principles of enforcement
jurisdiction.5 It does not argue that there will be no limits on such
searches, but rather that such limits are not deducible from
norms of territorialism. Instead, the limits will emerge from a
messy process of cross-border search and retaliation, as nations
adjust themselves to the changed circumstances of a new technol-
ogy. Along the way, the essay hopes to shed light on the relation-
ship between technological change and the evolution of our juris-
dictional concepts.
A caveat is in order at the outset. In arguing that remote
cross-border searches can be legal from a jurisdictional perspec-
2 See, for example, Stephen Wilske and Teresa Schiller, International Jurisdiction in
Cyberspace: Which States May Regulate the Internet?, 50 Fed Commun L J 117, 174
(1997); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 41 Vill L Rev 1, 82-83 (1996).
See also Lemos, Lawyers Slam FBI 'Hack,' ZDNet News (cited in note 1); Linn, FBI's
Elaborate Hacker Sting, Chi Trib at 20 (cited in note 1).
3 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law § 432 comment b (1987).
4 Id (emphasis added).
5 Many other elements of international law might be relevant here, including, poten-
tially, the U.N. Charter's prohibition on the use of force except in self-defense. Charter of
the United Nations, Arts 2, 51, 59 Stat 1031, Treaty Ser No 993 (1945). But in this sympo-
sium devoted to jurisdiction, I will focusoon international law of jurisdiction.
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tive, I do not (directly) address the many possible "substantive"
reasons why the exercise of this jurisdiction may be problematic.
Remote cross-border searches might be justified on jurisdictional
grounds but unjustified from the perspective of privacy or free
speech rights. These latter issues are important, and indeed they
might even be relevant to a jurisdictional analysis, as discussed
below. But a full analysis of individual rights restrictions on re-
mote cross-border searches is beyond the scope of this paper.' I
shall instead analyze the more fundamental jurisdictional issues
that are the subject of this symposium.
I. THE PRACTICAL NECESSITY OF REMOTE
CROSS-BORDER SEARCHES
The term "cybercrime" subsumes many different activities. I
focus here on "unauthorized access" crimes and "unauthorized
disruption" crimes (viruses, worms, logic bombs, trojan horses,
distributed denial of service attacks, etc.)' These are crimes com-
mitted by computers via the internet that illegally access or harm
files and programs on other computers. I am interested in such
crimes when they originate on computers in one country and ille-
gally access or cause damage to computers in another country.
The Russian hackers discussed at the outset provide an example
of unauthorized cross-border access. An example of unauthorized
cross-border disruption is the "I Love You" worm that originated
on a computer in the Philippines and caused over eleven billion
dollars in losses in the United States.8
Cybercrimes with these characteristics are difficult for the
nation where the crime occurs to regulate. As a general matter,
nations exercise regulatory control over internet transmissions
from abroad by regulating its local connections-assets, end-
users, internet intermediaries, and hardware and software within
their territories These forms of territorial regulation tend not to
6 See, for example, United States v Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 US 259 (1990) (holding
that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to searches and seizures of property owned by
non-resident aliens located in foreign countries).
7 For an overview of these types of cybercrimes, see Neil Kumar Katyal, Criminal
Law in Cyberspace, 149 U Pa L Rev 1003, 1013-27 (2001).
8 'Love Bug' Virus Case Dropped in Philippines; No Legal Grounds for Trial of Stu-
dent, Wash Post A12 (Aug 22, 2000).
9 For an elaboration of these truncated points, see Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyber-
anarchy, 65 U Chi L Rev 1199, 1221-24 (1998); Jack L. Goldsmith, The Internet and the
Abiding Significance of Territorial Sovereignty, 5 Ind J Global Legal Stud 475, 481-83
(1998).
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work well, however, with respect to cross-border crimes.1" Be-
cause such crimes are (usually) discrete events, it is hard for local
internet intermediaries to identify and screen out the pertinent
cross-border data flows at any cost short of ex ante examination
of every internet communication. Moreover, there is a special
need in this context to secure evidence of the crime immediately.
These crimes can be initiated in advance of detection. Pseudo-
nymity is relatively easy to achieve in the commission of these
crimes. And perhaps most importantly, evidence of the crime can
be destroyed relatively quickly."
For these reasons, enforcement authorities must address
cross-border crimes quickly at their source. One way to do this is
through cooperation between the nation subject to the attack and
the nation (or nations) from which, or through which, the attack
occurs. Officials in the originating state(s) can assist officials in
the target state in identifying, freezing, and retrieving evidence
related to the crime, and in apprehending the author of the crime
and either bringing her to justice in the originating state or ex-
traditing her to the target state for prosecution.
This, in a nutshell, is the strategy of the Council of Europe
Cybercrime Convention. 2 In addition to harmonizing domestic
definitions of cybercrime," the Convention aims to enhance fast
and effective international cooperation in preventing it. The Con-
vention requires each nation to enact laws authorizing expedited
searches, seizures, and preservations of computer data within the
territory.4 It also provides for rapid 6nforcement assistance. For
example, the Convention contemplates that nations where the
crime originates will, at the request of the nation where the crime
causes damage, preserve and disclose stored computer data., It
also contemplates that each treaty signatory will establish a
round-the-clock "point of contact" to ensure immediate assistance
for the purposes of cross-border information requests. 16
10 1 am assuming here that for the foreseeable future, purely defensive mechanisms
will be an inadequate response to cross-border cybercrimes.
11 See, for example, Katyal, 149 U Pa L Rev at 1074 (cited in note 7).
12 Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, 109th Sess, Convention on Cyber-Crime
(adopted Nov 8, 2001), available online at <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/projets/
FinalCybercrime.htm> (visited Nov 14, 2001) [on file with U Chi Legal F].
13 See id at Arts 2-13.
14 See id at Arts 16-21. The territorial limits on these activities is made explicit in
Articles 19 and 20 (which concern the search, seizure, and collection of data), by the juris-
dictional provisions in Article 23(a), and by Article 32, which limits cross-border searches
to publicly available data or private data only with consent.
15 See id at Arts 29-34.
16 Convention on Cyber-Crime at Art 35 (cited in note 12).
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Critics have attacked the European Cyber-Crime Convention
for, among many other reasons, threatening civil liberties and
imposing exorbitant obligations on internet service providers and
other intermediaries.17 And yet it seems clear that the Convention
as currently drafted will not adequately redress the problem of
cross-border unauthorized disruption crimes. It will take years to
finalize the treaty and secure its ratification and domestic im-
plementation. Effective responses are needed in the interim. Once
ratified, the cooperative mechanisms established by the Conven-
tion will only be effective if there is universal consent to the
treaty. The Convention will have little influence on crimes com-
mitted from safe-haven nations that do not ratify it.18 This sug-
gests that for the Convention to work, State parties will need to
impose significant collateral sanctions on nations that fail to rat-
ify, implement, or enforce it.
Most important for present purposes, the Convention does
not authorize remote cross-border searches, even in cases of
emergency or hot pursuit.19 Assuming that the Convention even-
tually comes into force, it requires a nation pursuing a cyber-
criminal to consult with local officials before seizing, storing, and
freezing data on computers located in their countries. ° Even with
the contemplated round-the-clock consultation and mutual assis-
tance machinery, this extra and unwieldy step will give cyber-
criminals precious time to cover their tracks. As the FBI's
counter-hack in the opening example suggests, effective enforce-
ment of cybercrime will sometimes demand unilateral remote
cross-border searches and seizures.
17 See Global Internet Liberty Campaign, Member Letter to Council of Europe Secre-
tary General Walter Schwimmer and COE Committee of Experts on Cyber Crime (Dec 12,
2000), available online at <http://www.gilc.org/privacy/coe-letter-1200.html> (visited Oct
25, 2001) [on file with U Chi Legal F]; Patti Waldmeir, Dark Side of Cybercrime Fight: An
International Treaty on Law Enforcement for the Web Poses Unsettling Questions About
Civil Liberties, Fin Times, Inside Track 17 (May 10, 2001); Paul Meller, ISP's join to cry
foul over pending European cybercrime rules, InfoWorld, Enterprise Networking 76c
(March 26, 2001).
18 At the margin it might influence the travel plans of known cyber-criminals, who
will face the possibility of being arrested and extradited if they travel from a safe haven to
a signatory country.
19 According to Guy de Val, Director-General for Legal Affairs for the Council of
Europe, the Convention "does not provide for actual cross-border investigations, nor cross-
border searches, 'because the states which negotiated the draft were unable to agree on
that point.'" See Europe Information Service, Cybercrime: Community Accession to an
International Convention, European Report (Mar 21, 2001). See also Convention on Cyber-
Crime (cited in note 12).
20 See Convention on Cyber-Crime at Arts 29, 31 (cited in note 12).
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II. THE LOGIC OF JURISDICTIONAL CHANGE
Are remote cross-border searches consistent with interna-
tional law principles of jurisdiction? The Council of Europe's fail-
ure to authorize such searches presupposes that international
law prohibits them in the absence of the consent of the nation in
which the searched computers are located. But is this true? Does
territorial sovereignty limit one nation's ability to search, seize,
and freeze data related to a crime that is located in another coun-
try where the crime originates?
In answering this question, consider first prescriptive juris-
diction, which is the power of a nation to apply its laws.21 It is
uncontroversial that the United States has prescriptive jurisdic-
tion to apply its criminal laws to, say, a crime that causes injury
in the United States that is initiated from a computer abroad.
International law principles of territorial sovereignty permit the
United States to apply its laws to activities abroad that have sub-
stantial effects in the United States.
The prohibition on seizing data abroad, however, is thought
to be an issue of enforcement jurisdiction. Enforcement jurisdic-
tion is a nation's power "to induce or compel compliance or to
punish noncompliance with its laws or regulations."23 As stated
above, conventional wisdom says that a nation may not enforce
its criminal laws outside of its territory.24 But were FBI officials
in our opening example enforcing laws outside the United States?
The FBI action is ambiguous. On the one hand, the FBI gathered
information physically located in another country. On the other
hand, FBI officials never left their offices in the United States;
they and their equipment remained at all times in the United
States.
The concept of territorial sovereignty by itself cannot choose
between these two conceptions of the remote cross-border seizure,
and cannot by itself tell us whether the search was legitimate.
"Territorial sovereignty" has never had a definitive content, has
never been unchanging or sacrosanct, and has never prohibited
all outside influences within a nation's borders.25 Moreover,
throughout history, nations have modified their views about the
significance of territorial borders and the meaning of a "territo-
21 See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 401(a) (1987).
22 See id at § 402(1)(c); Hartford Fire Insurance Co v California, 509 US 764 (1993).
23 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 401(c) (1987).
24 See text accompanying notes 2-3.
25 See generally Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton 1999).
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rial violation," in response to changed international circum-
stances, including changed technological circumstances. We thus
must look to history and reason by analogy to see whether, and to
what extent, cross-border searches are likely to become an ac-
cepted practice among nations.
Begin with some old and simple principles of jurisdiction.
Joseph Story famously stated the classical principles of territorial
sovereignty as follows. First, "every nation possesses an exclusive
sovereignty and jurisdiction within its own territory."26 Second,
no state or nation can, by its laws, directly affect, or bind
property out of its territory, or bind persons not resident
therein .... This is a natural consequence of the first
proposition; for it would be wholly incompatible with the
equality and exclusiveness of the sovereignty of all na-
tions, that any one nation should be at liberty to regulate
either persons or things not within its own territory. 7
The key word here is "directly." Even a territorialist like
Story realized that through purely territorial exercises of power,
one nation can indirectly regulate persons and property abroad.28
Indirect regulation works because the regulating nation brings
force to bear on persons and property within its territory, and
this purely local force (or threat of force) can have effects on be-
havior abroad. If an offshore person or firm causes local harm
from abroad, the local government can indirectly regulate the
harmful foreign activity by threatening to seize the offshore
firm's local assets. The United States is able to apply its securi-
ties laws, antitrust laws, and criminal laws to activities abroad
because many offshore entities have a U.S. presence (assets, em-
ployees, debts, etc.) that the United States can threaten to seize
in response to non-compliance with its regulations. The United
States is not the only nation to exercise this power. The European
Commission was able to block the proposed merger, approved by
U.S. officials, of the U.S. companies General Electric and Honey-
26 See Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, Foreign and Domestic, in
Regard to Contracts, Rights and Remedies, and Especially in Regard to Marriages, Di-
vorces, Wills, Successions, and Judgments § 18 at 19 (Little, Brown 2d ed 1841).
27 Id at § 20 (emphasis added).
28 Ulrich Huber, the sixteenth century Dutch scholar on whom Story relied, acknowl-
edged the same point. See Ulrich Huber, De Conflictu Legum Diversarum in Diversis
Imperiis (1689), excerpted and translated in Ernest G. Lorenzen, Selected Articles on the
Conflict of Laws 163-66 (Yale 1947).
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well International.29 The Commission had leverage over these
firms because the firms had extensive assets in Europe; the
threat of force against these assets gave the Commission the
power to halt the merger.
Nations have always exercised indirect extraterritorial regu-
lation of this sort. They have always exercised territorial power in
ways that changed behavior in other nations. Indeed, indirect
extraterritorial regulation of this sort is inevitable in a world of
decentralized lawmaking and trans-jurisdictional transactions.
One nation's regulation of a cross-border transaction will always
have consequences in other nations to which the transaction is
connected.
What has changed in modern times is not indirect extraterri-
torial regulation per se, but rather the scope of indirect extrater-
ritorial influence. Throughout modern history, the permissible
scope of a nation's extraterritorial influence has expanded pursu-
ant to the following inexorable logic. Technological and related
exogenous changes lower the costs of cross-border communication
and travel. These changes increase cross-border activity, and
make it easier for activity originating in jurisdiction A to have
effects (including harmful effects) in jurisdiction B. The govern-
ment of B, responsible for protecting local interests, takes in-
creasingly aggressive steps within its territory to redress these
new local harms from A. These steps expand the indirect extra-
territorial effect, in A, of B's purely territorial assertions of au-
thority. The result is a change in our conception of what "territo-
rial sovereignty" permits.
This in a nutshell is the logic and historical pattern of juris-
dictional change. Note several important characteristics of this
logic. First, changes in technology expand extraterritorial influ-
ence in both directions. Both the source nation and the target na-
tion, acting within their territory (where "acting" includes per-
mitting activity within the territory), have increasing influence
abroad. Second, the influence of territorial power simultaneously
expands and contracts, along different dimensions, through time.
In the example above, A at first glance seems empowered by
technological change, because activity within it (whether prohib-
ited or authorized by A's government) increasingly has effects
abroad. For the same reason, B initially seems weakened by
technological change. But B fights back with its own in-state acts,
29 See Edmund L. Andrews and Paul Meller, Europe Ends Bid by G.E. for Honeywell,
NY Times C1 (July 4, 2001).
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and these acts, in part facilitated by the technological change
that has increased cross-border activity in the first place, has
heightened extraterritorial effects in A. In both directions, tech-
nological change alters the extraterritorial influence of purely
territorial action.3°
To better understand these somewhat abstract points, and to
see how they apply to remote cross-border searches, begin with
personal jurisdiction. Like most exercises of jurisdiction, personal
jurisdiction was once conceptualized in purely territorial terms.
International law permitted states to assert personal jurisdiction
only if a defendant was served within its territory, or if the de-
fendant's property was attached within the territory.3'
This regime came under pressure with the advent of techno-
logical innovations such as the automobile and the telephone, and
related changes such as the rise of the multi-state corporation. 2
These developments made it easier for out-of-state actors to cause
local harms while at the same time escaping territorial service of
process. And this, in turn, enabled out-of-staters to avoid local
personal jurisdiction and thus local responsibility for local harms.
States refused to countenance these circumventions of local regu-
latory authority. They developed fictions that were nominally
consistent with hermetic territorialism but that allowed them to
expand their regulatory reach.3 Eventually, the Supreme Court
abandoned these fictions and held that federal due process al-
lowed states to serve defendants with process out of state, and
thus to establish personal jurisdiction over out-of-staters who
caused local harms.3 4 This change in due process law in effect ex-
panded the authority of states over out-of-state activities. Similar
trends took place on the international plane, for similar reasons. 5
Now consider the regulation of international markets. Before
World War II, international law prohibited nations from regulat-
30 The stylized example in the last two paragraphs purposefully abstracted away from
the' complication of power asymmetries.
31 See Pennoyer v Neff, 95 US 714, 730 (1877) (invoking law of nations).
32 See Hanson v Denckla, 357 US 235, 251, 260 (1958); McGee v International Life
Insurance Co, 355 US 220, 222-23 (1957); Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due
Process Clause, and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts: From Pennoyer to
Dencklw A Review, 25 U Chi L Rev 569, 573 (1958).
33 See Henry L. Doherty & Co v Goodman, 294 US 623 (1935); Hess v Pawloski, 274
US 352 (1927); Kane v New Jersey, 242 US 160 (1916).
34 See, for example, Burger King Corp v Rudzewicz, 471 US 462 (1985); International
Shoe Co v Washington, 326 US 310 (1945).
35 See generally Friedrich Juenger, Federalism: Judicial Jurisdiction in the United
States and in the European Communities: A Comparison, 82 Mich L Rev 1195 (1984).
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ing activities in foreign markets." As technological change follow-
ing World War II led to more interdependent international mar-
kets, and as the regulatory state burgeoned, the United States
began to apply its antitrust and securities laws to regulate activi-
ties abroad." The United States viewed such extraterritorial
regulation as necessary to protect local markets that, in an in-
creasingly integrated global economy, could more easily be af-
fected by activities abroad. Ultimately, the United States was
successful in asserting its regulatory authority* in this way be-
cause it could threaten the local assets of firms engaging in harm-
ful offshore activity. Other countries originally greeted U.S. ex-
traterritorial regulation with indignant protest, arguing that the
United States was illegitimately influencing activity outside its
borders. 8 But today the "effects" test for extraterritorial regula-
tion is well established around the world. 9
The lesson here, once again, is that exogenous communica-
tion and technological changes increased local harms from
abroad, and aggressive regulatory responses to these harms both
expanded indirect extraterritorial influence and altered the ac-
cepted norms of territorial sovereignty. Just as in the personal
jurisdiction example, what nations once viewed as impermissibly
"extraterritorial" came to be viewed as a legitimate territorial
action justified by the need to redress the harmful local effects of
offshore activities.
The extraterritorial economic regulations examples involve
prescriptive rather than enforcement jurisdiction. But this dis-
tinction is misleading.4" The only reason that extraterritorial pre-
36 An example of the strictly territorial application of regulatory authority in the
United States is American Banana Co v United Fruit Co, 213 US 347, 359 (1909) (holding
that U.S. antitrust law has no extraterritorial application).
37 See, for example, Schoenbaum v Firstbrook, 405 F2d 200, 208 (2d Cir 1968) (apply-
ing U.S. securities law to foreign transactions with local effects); United States v Alumi-
num Co of America, 148 F2d 416, 424 (2d Cir 1945) (applying U.S. antitrust law to off-
shore activity with local effects).
38 See Gary Born and David Westin, International Civil Litigation in United States
Courts: Commentary and Materials 600-03 (Kluwer 2d ed 1992).
39 A good example is the European Commission's actions mentioned above at note 29.
More broadly, the Europeans have embraced an effects test for extraterritorial regulation
very similar to the United States approach Europe used to abhor. See Roger P. Alford, The
Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws: The United States and European Commu-
nity Approaches, 33 Va J Intl L 1 (1992).
40 It is perhaps worth noting in this regard that the distinction between prescriptive
and enforcement jurisdiction, like many other distinctions in international law, is an in-
vention of the American Law Institute's Restatement project. One does not find mention of
the distinction before the 1965 Restatement, or in non-U.S. discussions of international
law.
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scriptive authority is efficacious in these regulatory contexts is
that territorial enforcement authority provided leverage over for-
eign activity. Acting purely within its territory, the United States
was able to bring about change abroad, and thus to indirectly en-
force its laws abroad to regulate activity there.
Now consider an example that clearly involves enforcement
jurisdiction and is directly analogous to remote cross-border
searches on the internet. At one time, the United States refused
to order firms with a U.S. presence to disclose documents abroad
if doing so violated foreign bank secrecy law.4 These courts rea-
soned that such disclosure orders exceeded the limits of enforce-
ment jurisdiction and were inconsistent with international com-
ity. U.S. courts began to change their tune, however, in the face of
technological changes that made it easier to avoid liability for
local harms by transferring and hiding illegal funds and transac-
tions in banks and institutions abroad.42 Many U.S. courts have
ordered a U.S. branch office to disclose documents in a parent or
branch abroad, even if doing so violates foreign law.43 Such orders
are obeyed because of the court's credible threat to seize or fine
local assets. These judicial orders clearly have the direct and im-
mediate effect of revealing information from abroad, even though
the court's power technically extends only to its territorial border.
We can now generalize about the relationship between tech-
nological change and jurisdictional scope. Technological develop-
ments in communication and transportation increase cross-border
activity between nations. This has made it cheaper, and thus eas-
ier, for out-of-state actors to cause local harm from abroad. If the
local government cannot secure adequate cooperation from for-
eign authorities to fully redress such harms, it will take unilat-
eral steps to address them. Governments tend not to send police
forces into other nations without permission-though they some-
times do.44 Instead, governments usually take steps within their
territories to indirectly alter offensive behavior abroad. These in-
41 See, for example, Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F2d 611, 612-13 (2d
Cir 1962); Ings v Ferguson, 282 F2d 149, 152-53 (2d Cir 1960); First National City Bank of
New York v IRS, 271 F2d 616, 619 (2d Cir 1959).
42 See C. Todd Jones, Compulsion Over Comity: The United States'Assault on Foreign
Bank Secrecy, 12 Nw J Intl L & Bus 454 (1992).
43 See In re Grand Jury Proceedings Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F2d 817, 832-33 (11th
Cir 1984); United States v Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F2d 1384, 1390-91 (11th Cir 1982);
SEC v Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 FRD 111, 118-19 (S D NY 1981). See also Jones,
12 Nw J Intl L & Bus at 464-71, 488-99, 502-07 (cited in note 42).
44 Consider, for example, NATO's recent bombing of Kosovo, the first George Bush's
invasion of Panama, and the Russian invasion of Chechnya.
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creasingly aggressive steps are necessary to redress increasing
local harms from abroad. "Law" follows behavior here, resulting
in an altered conception of what "territorial sovereignty" requires
and an expansion in permissible "extraterritorial" activity. 41
To this generalization we can add a different but related one
that also sheds light on cross-border internet searches. Nations
have long gathered information located in other nations without
physically entering the territory of those nations. For hundreds of
years, ships on the high seas have used binoculars, spyglasses,
telescopes, and periscopes to learn what's going on inside a coun-
try. Balloon aerial surveillance dates to the French revolution,46
and was frequently employed in the American Civil War.47 Air-
plane reconnaissance dates to the 1911 Italo-Turkish War, and
remains an important means of cross-border surveillance..4 Dur-
ing the last fifty years the United States has made tens of thou-
sands of flights in international air space to gather reconnais-
sance information inside other countries. 49 At least half a dozen
countries (not to mention scores of private firms) employ orbital
reconnaissance satellites to monitor activities within other coun-
tries. The most sophisticated of these satellites can distinguish
objects that are as small as six inches, and digital data provided
by these satellites can be further manipulated by local computers
to provide even more detailed three-dimensional images."
So once again, we see technological innovation making it eas-
ier and easier for one nation to gather information in another na-
tion without physically crossing borders. Norms of "territorial
sovereignty" have never precluded such offshore espionage. There
is a simple reason for this: Nations are interested in what goes on
inside other nations, and there is no across-the-board, cost-
effective way to stop such spying. We do, of course, see a techno-
logical arms race: The nation where the information is located
45 For a general account of this method of international law development, see Jack L.
Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U Chi L Rev
1113, 1120-39 (1999).
46 See General Carl Spaatz, Evolution of Air Power: Our Urgent Need for an Air Force
Second to None, 11 Milit Affairs 2, 3 (Spring 1947).
47 For a general discussion, see Edwin C. Fishel, The Secret War for the Union: The
Untold Story of Military Intelligence in the Civil War (Houghton, Mifflin 1996).
48 See Jeffrey T. Richelson, A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century
17 (Oxford 1995).
49 Christopher Drew, Collision with China: Intelligence Gathering, NY Times A6 (Apr
14, 2001).
50 See Robert Windrem, Spy Satellites Enter New Dimension, MSNBC (Aug 8, 1998),
available online at <http://www.msnbc.com/news/185953.asp?cpl=l> (visited July 7, 2001)
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takes steps within its territory to block or counteract the offshore
surveillance, and the nation conducting the surveillance takes
counter measures. The important point, however, is that these
activities, though sometimes decried, have always been practiced,
and are consistent with norms of territorial sovereignty and the
limitations on enforcement jurisdiction."
III. THE VALIDITY AND LIMITS OF REMOTE
CROSS-BORDER SEARCHES
With these examples and principles in mind, we return to
remote cross-border searches on the internet. Many analogize
these cross-border searches to physical invasion of police forces
into another territory. But the analogy is not persuasive. Such
searches are, instead, better analogized to the grand jury orders
and spy techniques outlined above. Cross-border searches and
seizures are like grand jury orders because they leverage power
in the United States to achieve disclosure of information abroad.
And they are like spy techniques because they use a universal
medium to observe events in another country. Seen this way, re-
mote cross-border searches fit into the long-accepted practice of
officials in one nation acting within their territory (or from public
spaces) to extract information from another.
These analogies are not perfect, of course. The costs of cross-
border internet searches are lower than many other exercises of
extraterritorial influence. As a result, one might worry that the
potential for abuse in the use of internet cross-border searches
and seizures is higher than more traditional counterparts, like
grand jury orders. The point so far has been simply to show that
international law principles of enforcement jurisdiction do not
clearly prohibit such searches, and that the concept of "territorial
sovereignty" by itself does little, if any, analytical work in deter-
mining the validity of such searches under international law.
There is little doubt that if such searches prove necessary to re-
dress cross-border internet attacks, international law will adapt
to permit them in some circumstances. As we have seen, the his-
51 Under international law, nations enjoy exclusive authority over the airspace above
their territory, but this authority does not extend to outer space. Therefore, one nation's
satellite may orbit over the territory of another and gather information without permis-
sion. See Joseph A. Bosco, International Outer Space Law: A Brief Overview, 9 Air & Space
Law 3, 5 (Spring 1995). Such satellite surveillance is justified by analogy to surveillance
from the high seas, which has long been viewed as legal. Robert A. Ramey, Armed Conflict
on the Final Frontier: The Law of War in Space, 48 AF L Rev 1, 65 (2000); John Kish,
International Law and Espionage 115-120 (Kluwer 1995) (David Turns, ed).
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tory of international jurisdiction is one of the law accommodating
the nations' felt needs to take steps within their borders to re-
dress local harms caused from abroad that cannot otherwise be
addressed. Nations will not, and cannot, be expected to acquiesce
in the face of a damaging cross-border attack. As the Trail
Smelter arbitration panel said in a different but related context,
"no state has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in
such a manner as to cause injury ... in or to the territory of an-
other."52
There are essentially two responses to these arguments. One
is a worry that remote cross-border searches will be abused-that
nations will conduct such searches when other, less offensive
means might achieve the same end. The second response is based
on a worry about reciprocity and retaliation. If FBI officials can
engage in remote cross-border searches, then governmental offi-
cials-not to mention private parties-in other countries can do
the same to U.S. computer databases. The practice threatens to
spin out of control, resulting in massive violations of territorial
sovereignty and computer privacy that make all nations worse
off.
These are understandable concerns. But I believe that they
will prove to be unfounded. Just as there is every reason to think
that remote cross-border searches will be necessary in some cir-
cumstances, there is every reason to believe that sensible limits
on cross-border searches will develop. They will develop not as a
deduction from legal concepts like territorial sovereignty. Instead,
they will emerge the way all new principles of customary interna-
tional law emerge: through a process of trial and error, thrust
and counterthrust, as nations accommodate themselves to the
costs and benefits of a new technology and its regulation.
As an initial matter, the two concerns expressed above-
abuse and reciprocity-will cancel one another out to some ex-
tent. Nations tend to be aggressively extraterritorial when they
can get away with it, but they tend to check extraterritorial ac-
tion when it can be reciprocated to their detriment. In this sense,
the ease with which the internet permits cross-border searches
will operate as a natural check on aggressive cross-border
searches. In the internet context, the United States cannot, as it
has in "real space" for decades, engage in aggressive extraterrito-
rial activity with impunity. The consternation in the United
52 United States v Canada, 3 R Intl Arb Awards 1905, 1965 (1938).
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States over the European Data Protection Initiative," and the
recent French court injunction on the U.S. firm Yahoo!'s web auc-
tions,54 shows that the internet is potentially a great equalizer of
extraterritorial authority.
Because aggressive cross-border searches can easily be
reciprocated, governments will have incentives to limit their
searches to exigent circumstances, and to work out cooperative
principles where possible. Another important reason to expect
limits on cross-border searches is that a search, by itself, is
usually not very helpful in bringing a cybercriminal to justice in
the target state. In most circumstances, the target nation will
need the cooperation-through extradition or some similar
arrangement--of the source country to actually enforce U.S. law
against criminal defendants.55 Cross-border searches viewed as
illegitimate by a source country will not incline that country to
provide such cooperation.
Finally, nations that are subject to cross-border searches will
have incentives to provide meaningful and hurried assistance in
redressing crimes that originate from their borders. For to the
extent they provide such assistance, there will be less need for
unilateral cross-border searches. This in a nutshell is why there
has been such enthusiastic agreement among participating na-
tions on the cooperative aspects of the European Cybercrime
Convention.
CONCLUSION
This essay has argued that cross-border searches are a nec-
essary tool in the fight against cross-border cybercrime. It has
tried to show that such searches are not prohibited by norms of
territorial sovereignty, and are not without precedent. It has also
tried to sketch the norms that are likely to emerge in the exercise
53 On the debate sparked by the European Data Protection Initiative, see generally
Peter P. Swire and Robert Litan, None of Your Business: World Data Flows, Electronic
Commerce, and the European Privacy Directive (Brookings 1998).
54 See Jack L. Goldsmith, Yahoo! Brought Down to Earth, Fin Times, Comment &
Analysis 27 (Nov 26, 2000).
55 The opening example of the Russian hackers is a counterexample. There, U.S.
officials were able to lure the Russian criminals into the United States, where they were
apprehended and charged. See Lemos, Lawyers Slam FBI 'Hack,' ZDNet News (cited in
note 1); Linn, FBI's Elaborate Hacker Sting, Chi Trib at 20 (cited in note 1). One of the
Russian hackers was found guilty of multiple counts of fraud, conspiracy, and computer
crimes while the other awaited trial in New Jersey. See Michelle Delio, 'Stung' Russian
Hacker Guilty, Wired News (Oct 17, 2001); available online at <http//www.wired.com/
news/print/0,1294,47650,00.html> (visited Oct 20, 2001) [on file with U Chi Legal F].
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of such searches, as well as the reasons why these norms will
emerge.
In light of these arguments, the early uses of unilateral ex-
traterritorial enforcement measures should not be viewed as an
illegitimate invasion of another nation's sovereignty. Cross-
border searches and seizures should be viewed instead as part of
the inevitably messy process of working out new customary prin-
ciples of sovereignty to accommodate a new and important, but
also potentially dangerous, technology.
